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Abstract 
Negative perceptions about migrants in Europe, the Continent with the largest social policy 
programmes, are driven by concerns that foreigners are a net fiscal burden. Increasing 
concerns are pressing Governments, in the midst of the recession, to reduce welfare access by 
migrants or further tighten migration policies. Are there politically feasible alternatives to 
these two hardly enforceable (and procyclical) policy options? In this paper we look at 
economic and cultural determinants of negative perceptions about migrants in Europe. Based 
on a simple model of the perceived fiscal effects of migration and on a largely unexploited 
database (EU-Silc), we find no evidence that legal migrants, notably skilled migrants, are net 
recipients of transfers from the state. However, there is evidence of “residual dependency” on 
contributory transfers and self-selection migrants more likely to draw on welfare in the 
countries with the most generous welfare state. Moreover, those favouring redistribution to 
the poor do not overlap with those considering migrants as part of the same community. A 
way out of the migration dilemma facing Europe involves i. co-ordinating safety nets across 
the EU, and ii. adopting explicitly selective migration policies. Other options involve 
restricting welfare access by migrants and subsidising voluntary return migration of low-
skilled migrants during the recession.  
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1. Introduction 
Immigration to Europe increased sharply in the last 20 years. The countries that 
attracted most of the migrants are currently experiencing one of the worst recessions 
in history. Pressures from public opinion are mounting to further tighten migration 
policies and cut on welfare access by migrants. But these policies are not fully 
enforceable, may reduce the assimilation of those migrants who are already in 
Europe, somewhat reduce the work of automatic stabilizers just while they should be 
fully operational to counteract the recession and can be challenged on equity 
grounds. At the same time, there are costs in doing nothing related to social 
cohesion, as witnessed by the development of xenophobic movements across Europe 
and increasing concerns of citizens with respect to the role of immigrants.  
In this paper we discuss ways out of this policy dilemma. We start by characterising 
the evolution of sentiments of Europeans vis-à-vis migrants, identifying the main 
determinants of the mounting negative perceptions concerning their role in society. 
We find that migration to the land of redistribution perhaps unsurprisingly creates 
dominant concerns about the sustainability of these policies under large inflows of 
migrants. Thus, we develop a simple model enabling us to isolate the main channels 
by which migration may affect redistributive policies and the perceptions of citizens 
as to the relation between migration and social policies. Guided by this model, we 
then go back to the data and analyse available evidence on the (static) net fiscal 
position of migrants, on their “residual dependency” on social transfers and on the 
role played by welfare floors in self-selecting low-skilled migrants.  We also look at 
the, admittedly scant, evidence available on perceptions about redistribution and 
identity of Europeans. Our main findings are that there are both economic and 
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cultural reasons for the growing concerns of Europeans. However, the policy 
response, which so far involved a tightening of migration restrictions, is clearly 
inadequate to cope with these concerns. Thus, in the last section of the paper we 
propose a threefold strategy to deal with the European migration policy dilemma. 
This is based on a mix of selective migration policies, incentives to return migration 
of unskilled migrants and co-ordination of welfare minima at the European scale.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section Two dwells on perceptions of 
Europeans about migrants. Section Three evaluates the net fiscal position of migrants 
and their residual dependency on welfare by also disentangling contributory from 
non-contributory transfers. Section Four provides evidence on the perceived identity 
of natives and on preferences for redistribution. Finally, Section Five discusses policy 
options for Europe.  
 
2. Opinions of EU citizens about migrants 
Perceptions of Europeans with respect to the economic and social role of migrants 
are deteriorating, notably in the countries recently experiencing the largest 
immigration waves. These perceptions turned into outright hostility vis-à-vis 
migrants as the recession deepened at the beginning of 2009. We document in this 
section that a driving force of these negative perceptions are concerns over the net 
fiscal position of migration, that is, their access to social welfare and the pressure 
exerted on state transfers by those being displaced by migrants. 
 
2.1. Overall Perceptions 
Table 1 draws on two waves of the European Social Survey, an EC-sponsored cross-
sectional survey initiated in 2002. The focus is on the five largest recent immigration 
EU countries. The table displays the fraction of respondents agreeing with general 
statements as to the overall social and economic desirability of immigration. In 
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particular, individuals agree that “it is bad for [country]’s economy that people come 
to live here from other countries” or that “[country] is made a worse place to live by 
people coming here to live from other countries”.  There is also a question on the 
desirability of measures forcing migrants to leave, i.e. “people who come here to live 
and are unemployed for a long period, should be made to leave”. This question 
unfortunately was not repeated in 2006, but a very similar one was included in a 
February 2009 Harris survey: “Do you support government asking immigrants to 
leave the country if they do not have a job”?   
As shown by the table, negative perceptions appear to be increasing over time in all 
countries. Although the ESS and the Harris surveys are not strictly comparable, the 
support to measures forcing unemployed migrants to leave would also seem to have 
grown significantly during the Depression. In all countries a majority of citizens was 
in February 2009 in favour of repatriating migrants becoming long-term 
unemployed. Previous work on preferences over immigration policy (Scheve and 
Slaughter, 2001; Boeri et al., 2002; Mayda and Rodrik, 2001 and O’Rourke, 2003) also 
found increasing concerns over the economic consequences of migration, notably 
among the unskilled workers.  
 
Table 1 
Perceptions in the largest EU immigration countries 
% of respondents agreeing with 
the following statements Germany Spain France 
United 
Kingdom  Italy 1) 
ESS 2002 29 23 28 43 25 
ESS 2006 38 24 39 45 41 
"immigration bad 
for country's 
economy" 2006-2002 9 1 11 2 16 
ESS 2002 33 34 37 41 39 
ESS 2006 41 35 42 46 54 
 "immigrants make 
country worse 
place to live" 2006-2002 7 1 5 5 14 
ESS 2002 50 25 32 53 49 
Harris 2009 67 71 51 78 79 
"unemployed 
immigrants should 
be made to leave" 2009-2002 17 46 19 25 30 
  Notes: 1) The ESS survey took place in Italy only in 2002 and 2004. 
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What drives negative perceptions of Europeans with respect to migrants? The 2002 
wave of the ESS allowed for a battery of questions on specific dimensions of the 
immigration problem, allowing us to assess the determinants of these negative 
perceptions. In particular, questions were included as to the fiscal position of 
migrants, the effects of migration on job opportunities and wages of natives as well 
as on poverty and crime rates. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the importance of each 
of these factors in affecting overall perceptions about migrants. 
 
2.2. Specific sources of concern 
Table 2 displays a multivariate analysis of the determinants of the negative 
sentiments of Europeans vis-a-vis migrants, pooling cross-sectional observations 
across all countries covered by the 2002 ESS wave and using OLS estimators. All 
variables are expressed as 0-5 indexes (some were actually in a 0-10 range, but were 
rescaled for the purpose of comparability): where 0 means full agreement and 5 full 
disagreement. The dependent variable relates to the overall assessment of the 
economic role of migrants (“immigration is good or bad for our economy?”) already 
summarised in Table 1. Among the independent variables, indexes capturing 
concerns about the net fiscal position of migrants (“Most people who come to live here 
work and pay taxes.  They also use health and welfare services.  On balance, do you think 
people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?”), 
the effects on poverty and unemployment rates (averaging scores for two questions1, 
namely “immigrants take jobs away” and “harm prospects of the poor”), wages (“average 
wages are reduced by migrants”) and crime (“immigrants make [country]’s crime rate 
worse”). We also add variables capturing personal characteristics such as age, gender, 
educational attainment, citizenship, income level and ideology. We run a simple 
linear regression as the various indexes (with the partial exception of the crime 
index) are distributed over the entire range of values (see Figure A1 in Annex A). 
                                                        
1 Dustmann and Preston (2004) carried out a factor analysis of these indexes finding that the 
question on job opportunities had a much stronger effect on the perceived net fiscal position than 
on the labour market (wage) index. 
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Two facts are particularly important. First, the single most important characteristic 
affecting perceptions is education: highly educated individuals have a much more 
favourable perception of migrants than the other socio-economic groups.  
Second, the net fiscal position of migrants is by and large the main driver of negative 
perceptions, followed by concerns over poverty among natives and crime. All this 
suggests that the net access of migrants to state transfers is the key concern of 
Europeans. The second most important determinant of negative perceptions, namely 
concerns about migration related to poverty and unemployment, can be interpreted 
as a by-product of concerns about migration-related welfare access. 
In order to assess the role potentially played by education in conjunction with other 
personal characteristics, we also run separate regressions for individuals with 
primary or lower education and for individuals with at least tertiary education.  The 
results are displayed in the second and third columns of Table 2.  They suggest that 
being unemployed affects negatively perceptions about migrants only among the 
unskilled. Concerns about unemployment related to migration and the crowding out 
of assistance to the poor are also felt more among the unskilled, while skilled 
individuals are relatively more concerned about the effects of migration on wages. 
Finally, concerns about crime are also more important in affecting overall 
perceptions within the group of individuals with primary or lower education.  It is 
also noticeable that the fact of having immigrants as relatives or friends significantly 
improves perceptions, both among skilled and unskilled individuals. 
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Table 2 
Perceptions of migrants and sources of concern 
 
Overall Economy 
Dependent variable: Migrants are bad/good (0-5) for the 
economy 
  All primary edu tertiary edu 
Age 0.002*** 0.002 0.003*** 
 (4.257) (1.017) (3.132) 
Male 0.106*** 0.069** 0.131*** 
 (9.889) (2.130) (6.226) 
Primary edu -0.131*** 
  
 (-6.910) 
  
Tertiary edu 0.132*** 
  
 (9.752) 
  
Unemployed -0.020 -0.134* 0.018 
 (-0.759) (-1.652) (0.277) 
Inactive 0.003 -0.143 0.074 
 (0.083) (-1.560) (0.752) 
Retired 0.006 0.020 -0.012 
 (0.333) (0.431) (-0.293) 
Student 0.059** 0.065 -0.024 
 (2.221) (0.629) (-0.473) 
Self-employed 0.006 0.010 -0.043 
 (0.376) (0.247) (-1.335) 
Immigrant 0.133*** 0.131* 0.114*** 
 (6.714) (1.907) (3.347) 
Relative/friend immig 0.087*** 0.081** 0.109*** 
 (7.348) (2.182) (4.643) 
Living in city 0.055*** 0.090** 0.051** 
 (4.744) (2.431) (2.410) 
High income 0.088*** -0.035 0.070 
 (4.561) (-0.486) (1.591) 
Middle income 0.045*** 0.027 -0.001 
 (2.861) (0.702) (-0.022) 
Left-wing ideology 0.010*** 0.007 0.011** 
 (4.229) (1.138) (2.336) 
Fiscal drain  0.318*** 0.309*** 0.304*** 
 (47.888) (16.859) (22.027) 
Poverty/unemployment  0.182*** 0.206*** 0.190*** 
 (30.525) (11.605) (16.172) 
Crime rates 0.162*** 0.224*** 0.128*** 
 (23.700) (11.665) (8.993) 
Wage effects 0.083*** 0.099*** 0.064*** 
 (14.342) (6.020) (5.487) 
Constant 1.227*** -0.564 0.907*** 
  (23.693) (-0.971) (8.437) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20492 2564 4915 
R squared 0.39 0.42 0.32 
  Notes: t statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent,  
  *** significant at 1per cent.  
  Source: ESS 2002. 
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Unfortunately the questions related to specific dimensions of concerns over 
immigration were not repeated over time. Thus, we cannot evaluate their role in the 
deterioration of perceptions. Yet, we could run panel regressions where the 
dependent variable is once again the overall concerns, controlling for the same set of 
individual characteristics listed in Table 2 as well as whether or not the respondents 
were receiving a social transfer (unemployment benefit, redundancy benefit or “any 
other social benefits or grants”) from the state. This variable may capture concern 
about crowding out of welfare payments associated with migration. Results 
(available from the author upon request) suggests that the receipt of benefits is 
negatively associated with perceptions over migrants and this effect holds only for 
persons with secondary or lower levels of education. 
The importance of welfare access in perceptions of Europeans concerning migration 
is confirmed by earlier waves of the Eurobarometer survey, covering the EU-15 
countries. The fraction of respondents agreeing with the statement that “Minority 
groups exploit the system of social welfare” has been increasing from 45 to 51 per 
cent in the EU15 in the 1994-2000 period.2.  
 
3. Understanding perceptions: theory 
A simple static model of migration is useful at this stage to characterise the main 
channels by which immigration can affect welfare of incumbents by affecting both 
the generosity and the desirability of redistributive policies. We neglect fiscal effects 
coming from the labour market, e.g., arising from unemployment related to 
migration or by wage effects, as these effects would be primarily captured by 
                                                        
2 Probit regressions (available from the author upon request) of the probability of agreeing with 
this statement against personal economic characteristics -- such as age, education, income and 
labour market status -- as well as ideological factors – political location or idiosyncrasies with 
respect to specific minorities, e.g., Muslim people (the dummy religion captures individuals who 
would accept migrants, provided that they are not of Muslim religion) explain about 8 per cent of 
the total variance. The results suggest that economic factors are important in affecting 
perceptions of welfare abuse. These concerns are more widespread among older people, persons 
with lower levels of education, unemployed people and persons with lower incomes. Ideological 
features are also important: political affiliation and religion dummies are all highly significant 
and in line with a priori expectations.  
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perceptions about the labour market impact of migration, which are relatively 
second order in the minds of Europeans. Empirical research on the impact of 
migration on employment and wages in Europe also suggests that these effects are 
small (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick, 2002). 
 
3.1. The model with no labour market effects of migration 
There are two types of agents, skilled and unskilled workers, who are both risk-
neutral and can be either employed or unemployed (there is no inactivity in this 
setting). Welfare of skilled workers and unskilled workers (denoted by superscripts S 
and N respectively) is given by: 
 
buutwW SSS
S +−−= )1)(1(   (1) 
and 
buutwW NNN
N +−−= )1)(1(  (2) 
 
where wi denote wages, ui is the skill-specific unemployment rate, and t is the 
proportional tax rate paying the unemployment benefits, assumed to be the only 
redistributive transfer in this economy.  
The participation constraint requires that btwN >− )1( . Normalize both the skilled 
and unskilled native populations by one so that before migration takes place skilled 
and unskilled workers are equally numbered. Both the level and skill composition of 
migration are considered exogenous at this stage. Denote the number of migrants 
relative to the native population by m and by γ the share of unskilled workers among 
migrants. Appropriate assumptions about wage setting make sure that 
unemployment among skilled workers is always zero so that taxes are for skilled 
workers a pure transfer to unskilled workers. Assume further that there is no 
discrimination in the labour market so that the unemployment rate of unskilled 
natives and unskilled migrants is the same. 
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Benefit levels are set to clear the Government budget per any given tax rate: 
 
mmu
mwmw
tb
N
Ns
φγ
γγ
++
++−+
= )1(
)1())1(1(
   (3) 
 
where -1<φ <1 denotes migrants (not) receiving transfers independently of their 
formal entitlement. This “residual dependency” term captures low take up (when φ  
is negative) or abuse (a positive φ ) of transfers by migrant population.   
Under our assumptions: 
dm
db
u
dm
dW
db
dW
N
N
==     (4) 
  
so that the effects of migration on welfare of natives are determined solely by the 
responsiveness of transfers to migration. Now by (2) and (3) we have that 
 
[ ]
mmu
buwwt
dm
db
N
NNs
φγ
φγγγ
++
+−+−
= )1(
)()1(
  (5) 
 
Equation (5) indicates that the effects of migration on welfare of natives depends on 
the net fiscal position of migrants, notably on whether their taxed incomes (first term 
in the numerator) exceed the amount paid to them in terms of social transfers 
(second term in the numerator).  
Notice that two crucial variables affecting the net fiscal position of migrants are the 
share of unskilled workers among migrants, γ, and the residual dependency term, φ . 
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3.2. Altruism and Identity 
An extension of this model is to allow for preferences for redistribution (Alesina and 
Giuliano, 2009) and altruism with respect to person belonging to the same 
community (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). In particular, assume that welfare of skilled 
workers is decreasing in the amount transferred to the migrants who are not 
perceived as members of their community. To the extent that some fraction 0<ϕ <1 of 
the transfers to the migrants go to persons perceived as belonging to a different 
identity, we have that:  
 
)()1)(1( mubutwW NSSS φγϕ +−−−=   (6) 
 
Hence, migration will now affect also welfare of skilled natives, as follows 
 




−+= φφγϕ b
dm
db
mu
dm
dW
S
S
)(    (7) 
 
Notice that now, even if migration does not affect neither taxes nor the generosity of 
unemployment benefits, it will still negatively affect welfare of natives to the extent 
that the latter perceive some migrants as less deserving redistributive policies than 
natives. 
 
3.3. Self-selection 
So far we have considered both the level and the skill content of migration as 
exogenous. Perceptions of EU citizens are however likely to take into account also 
the opposite causal link, one in which it is the generosity of the welfare state affects 
the scale and skill composition of migration, via the self-selection of low-skilled 
migrants into the countries having a more generous welfare state. The implication of 
self-selection of migrants on opinions about migration (on preferences with respect 
to migration policies) have been characterised by Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) -- 
drawing on previous work by Metzler and Richard (1981) -- as well as by Hassler et 
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al. (2002). These models suggest that it is mainly the percentage of low-skill types 
among migrants to negatively affect views about the acceptability of migrants.  
The decision rule of migrants in our static model can be simply modeled as a cost-
benefit test comparing net earnings (and transfers) in the country of destination and 
net earnings in the country of origin. Denoting by w0 earnings in the country of 
origin (the opportunity cost of migration) and by c mobility costs, and taking into 
account the budget constraint (3), we have that migration is convenient to skilled 
workers if: 
 
cwtw OS +>− )1(  
 
whilst the decision rule for unskilled workers is to migrate if: 
 
cwtbutw ONN +>+− )()1(  
 
Consider a situation where potential migrants (either skilled or unskilled) differ in 
terms of mobility costs (e.g., because of the varying distance between the destination 
country and their countries of origin). The above two inequalities can be solved to 
define for both skilled and unskilled migrants cutoff mobility costs, (cs and cu 
respectively), below which migration takes place, i.e. 
 
)()1()()1()( tbutwwtcandtwwtc NNONSOS −−−=−−=  
 
Differentiating the two cutoff costs with respect to the tax rate we have that  
 
00 <−=−=>= sNNNsS wudt
db
w
dt
dc
andw
dt
dc
 
 
It follows that the skill content of migration is decreasing in the generosity of the 
welfare state, that is γ(t) with γ‘>0. Assuming that the distribution of mobility costs 
for skilled and unskilled potential migrants is the same, we also have that changes in 
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the tax rate will only affect the skill composition of migration, without affecting its 
level, m. 
As discussed above, a decrease in the skill content of migration increases pressure on 
the welfare state, forcing Governments to provide a lower benefit level per any given 
tax rate. The self-selection of unskilled migrants is particularly important in 
evaluating the potential for a race-to-the bottom in welfare state provision as a result 
of migration, an issue which is taken up in Section 5 below.  
 
4. Understanding perceptions: data 
The previous two sections suggest that concerns of Europeans are likely to be driven 
by a negative fiscal position of migrants, which can be by itself a by-product of 
residual dependency on state transfers or of a predominance among migrants of 
persons with lower skills. Another interpretation is that, independently of the net 
fiscal position of migrants, natives dislike redistribution when perceived to be 
directed to individuals not belonging to the same community. In this Section we 
exploit all available data sources to evaluate the relevance of these explanations. 
Our main data source in assessing the net fiscal position of migrants and welfare 
dependency is the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), a 
standardized annual survey carried out in the European Union since 2004. It 
provides detailed information on the tax and benefit position of the interviewees and 
of their families. Unlike the previous EU-wide survey, the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP), it identifies all the different sources of incomes of the 
interviewee and her household and involves relatively large sample sizes allowing 
representation of the migrant population. For the time being only the cross-sectional 
dimension of the EU-Silc is available. Hopefully, in the near future, researchers will 
have access to the five year panel being developed in this survey. 
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Defining the immigrant status in the EU-Silc is not an easy task. There are two 
possibilities. The first is to define an immigrant as a non-citizen. The problem with 
this definition is that it may be biased by cross-country differences in naturalization 
laws. Moreover, the data files provided to researchers by Eurostat do not allow to 
identify the country of citizenship. We know only if the individual is a native, a 
citizen of another EU country or a non-EU citizen. The second option is to use 
information on the country of birth as a proxy for immigrant status. Here, the source 
of bias is misclassification of ‘true nationals’ born abroad for whatever reason as 
immigrants. Such a misclassification may be a serious source of bias for countries 
which have former colonies such as France, the U.K., Belgium and Portugal.  
Weighing pros and cons of the two alternative definitions, we opted for the former 
classification. In the analysis below, migrants are therefore defined on the basis of 
their citizenship. Moreover, we concentrate on immigrants coming from non-EU 
countries, those contributing the most to immigration and relevant for the design of 
migration policies. 
 
4.1. The net fiscal position of migrants 
EU-Silc data allow to estimate the net fiscal position of migrants by deducting from 
all transfers declared by the interviewees the taxes and social security contributions 
paid by the workers and their employers. This is clearly a static notion of the net 
fiscal position as no consideration is made of the lifetime contributions and benefits 
paid/received by the different households. This a serious limitation especially when 
assessing the contributions of migrants to public pension systems. Migrants are also 
typically younger than natives as the net benefits of migration are increasing in the 
expected length of the working life. Although large flows of immigrants typically 
improve pension balances in pay-as-you go systems, contributing to paying the 
pensions of the current retirees, this can only be a short-term relief: migrants 
themselves, sooner or later, will draw pensions, being a burden on the future 
generations. In an actuarially fair pension system, inflows of migrants can only alter 
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the temporal profile of pension outlays and net balances. There are, however, two 
important qualifications. First a long vesting period to qualify for social insurance, 
may prevent short-term migrants to reap the benefits of their past contributions. 
Legal migration, in this context, can improve fiscal positions also in the long-run, in 
that contributions by short-term migrants do not originate any entitlement to social 
benefits: the host country is free-riding on social security contributions of migrants. 
In addition to “social free-riding”, a second factor improving the sustainability of the 
pension system in the destination country is the increase in fertility generally 
associated with migration. However, the effect of migration on fertility is typically 
transitory. Within a couple of generations, migrants typically adapt to the fertility 
rates of natives. 
As the EU-SILC did not report gross-wages and taxes for Greece, Italy, and Portugal, 
these countries had to be dropped from our analysis. Moreover, the EU-SILC does 
not provide information on employers’ social security contributions3; thus, we 
imputed these contributions by applying the rules as detailed by the OECD 
publication “Taxing Wages” (editions 2003/2004 to 2005/2006). The latter provides a 
routine for each country belonging to the OECD that can be used to calculate the 
average employers’ social security contributions, conditional on gross-wages. 
Table 3 suggests that migrants to each European country for which data are 
available, except Spain, contribute less to tax revenues and social security 
contributions than implied by their share in the population. This result is hardly 
surprising as taxes are progressive in EU countries and social security contributions 
are proportional to earnings while migrant workers are generally concentrated at the 
low end of the earning distribution. 
 
 
 
                                                        
3 The EU-SILC committee decided that this information must be provided from MS only from 
2007 onwards. 
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Table 3 
Contributions of migrants to taxes and social security contributions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Country 
share of taxes paid by 
migrants  share of migrants in the population (1)/(2) 
Austria 3,06% 4,30% 0,71 
Belgium 1,76% 1,87% 0,94 
Denmark 1,01% 2,27% 0,45 
Finland 0,20% 0,67% 0,30 
France 1,19% 2,76% 0,43 
Germany+ 0,65% 1,08% 0,60 
Ireland 0,97% 1,71% 0,57 
Luxembourg 1,26% 2,25% 0,56 
Netherlands 0,09% 0,16% 0,55 
Norway 0,45% 1,44% 0,31 
Spain 2,62% 2,46% 1,07 
Sweden 0,42% 1,26% 0,33 
United Kingdom 2,54% 3,00% 0,85 
  Source: (EU SILC 2004, 2005, 2006; yearly averages) 
  *For this country in the EU-SILC no distinction is made between EU and non-EU migrants 
 
 
The fact that migrants pay proportionally less taxes and contributions than natives 
clearly does not imply that they are a fiscal burden. They may indeed also receive 
proportionally less transfers than natives. Thus, we turn our attention to intakes of 
social transfers. 
Figure 1 displays migrant to natives odds ratios in the receipt of various types of 
contributory and non-contributory transfers. A number larger than one denotes a 
condition in which migrants are over-represented in the population of recipients of 
that particular category of transfers. As can be seen from Figure 1, migrants are 
systematically overrepresented among the recipients of non-contributory transfers 
(social assistance and housing benefits), whilst they are less represented than natives 
among pensioners, recipients of sickness benefits and beneficiaries of unemployment 
insurance. Similar results were obtained by drawing on ECHP data and are not 
reported herein for brevity.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Odds ratios in Figure 1 disentangle contributory from non-contributory schemes as 
the former do not typically require mobilizing General Government revenues. 
However, three caveats apply to contributory transfers, which may affect the way in 
which the generic taxpayer is affected by migration into contributory schemes. First, 
migrants may have a higher than average risk of joblessness, which creates gaps in 
their contribution records and make them net beneficiaries of social security (unem-
ployment benefits and pension minima protecting against labor market risk inter-
acted with longevity risk). Secondly, also the contributory part of social welfare 
systems often envisages explicit redistributions from the rich to the poor, in addition 
to those implied by the higher exposure to unemployment risk of the unskilled 
workers. A number of provisions – such as benefit minima and maxima, a lower 
degree of indexation of benefits above these floors and eligibility conditions 
involving some degree of means-testing – introduce even in social insurance 
programmes an explicit cross-skill redistribution. Replacement rates offered by 
unemployment benefit systems are, for instance, steeply decreasing with the 
previous earnings of individuals, notably at rather long unemployment durations 
(Boeri, Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2006). Also public pension systems often involve a 
fairly large degree of within-generation redistribution.  The so-called “tax 
Migrant to natives odds ratios of the receipt of various types of 
cash  transfers in the EU15 
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component” (non-contributory component) of European pay-as-you-go systems 
(Disney, 2004) in some countries is even larger than the “contributory (or pure social 
insurance) component”. Put it another way, a large fraction of pension contributions 
is completely unrelated to future pension rights of contributors. Thirdly, migrants 
may also have less incentives than natives to seek for jobs when they are receiving 
social transfers. This means that migrants, feeling less constrained by social values 
rewarding public spiritedness (Algan and Cahuc, 2006), may have access to 
contributory schemes over and beyond what implied by their personal characteristics 
or average risk profile. Under these circumstances, migrants become more “welfare 
dependent” than natives, draining resources also from contributory schemes. This 
condition is also likely to be more frequent for migrants with higher than average 
labour market risk, ending in receipt of some social insurance schemes. 
Table 4 reports our estimates for the net fiscal position of migrants. The latter is 
obtained by adding up all taxes and contributions that the interviewee declares to 
have paid and subtracting from those all the transfers received according to the 
respondent. Among the latter the questionnaire includes contributory transfers such 
as unemployment, old-age, survivors, sickness and disability benefits as well as non 
contributory allowances like housing allowances, family-related transfers and sub-
sides that target specific marginalised groups (social exclusion). As no record is made 
of in-kind transfers (such as schooling or free health care), our estimates for the net 
fiscal position are biased upwards.  The overall average net fiscal position is indeed 
positive in all countries.  
With the above caveats in mind, the first column of table 4 displays the share of 
migrants who appear to be net contributors to the state budget. The second column 
shows the odds ratio, that is, the share of net contributors among migrants as a 
fraction of the share of net contributors among the natives. The third column 
displays the average net position of migrants and (in brackets) the standard 
deviation of these estimated individual net fiscal positions. Finally, the fourth 
column reports the difference in the average net fiscal position of natives and 
migrants, expressed as a ratio of the average net fiscal position in that country. 
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Table 4 
Net Fiscal Position of migrants 
Country 
share of net 
contributors 
(SNC) among 
migrants 
SNC: migrants 
over natives 
Average net 
position (ANP) 
(euros) 
Natives-
Migrants 
ANP overall 
Austria  79,59% 1,27 10257 
[3716,6]**
* 1,36 
Belgium  87,21% 0,97 12289 [5280,2]** 0,51 
Denmark  55,51% 0,72 -1026 [3566,3] -0,11 
Finland  49,62% 0,68 -3212 [5863,7] -0,32 
France  47,18% 0,85 -1706 [4653,6] -0,27 
Germany+  67,94% 0,84 2708 [3545,1] 0,48 
Ireland  55,41% 1,20 -1202 [8273,0] -0,49 
Luxembourg  57,40% 1,25 -1761 [6632,8] -0,48 
Norway  56,44% 0,90 -2826 [11840,1] -0,30 
Spain  91,21% 1,45 7715 
[557,89]**
* 2,17 
Sweden  50,05% 0,81 928 [6800,3] 0,06 
United 
Kingdom  69,66% 1,18 13570 [6638,0]** 1,73 
Source: (EU SILC 2004, 2005, 2006; yearly averages) 
*For this country in the EU-SILC no distinction is made between EU and non-EU migrants 
 
The first column of table 4 suggests that generally more than 50 per cent of the 
migrants are net contributors, according to our estimates. In some countries, notably 
Austria, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and the UK migrants are also over-represented 
in the population of net contributors (second column). This may be due to the fact 
that we are dealing with countries having recently experienced large inflows of 
migrants. Recent immigrants are typically much younger than natives and hence do 
not receive pensions, while they benefit from in-kind transfers, such as schooling for 
their children. There is also a very large heterogeneity in the net fiscal position of 
migrants, as documented by the large standard deviations reported in the third 
column. In those countries where the average net fiscal position of migrants is 
significantly different from zero, the average migrant is a net fiscal contributor and 
more so than the average native (fourth column).  Regressions (reported in Table A1 
in Annex A) estimating the effect of various personal characteristics, including skills, 
and the migrant status on this net fiscal position suggest that the skill level is a key 
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factor in determining the net fiscal position of natives and migrants: the higher the 
educational attainment, the better the fiscal position of both natives and migrants.  
 
4.2. Residual Dependency 
As discussed above, estimated net fiscal positions cannot measure large in-kind 
transfers to the migrants related to childcare, schooling and medical services. The 
potential fiscal burden associated with migration can be assessed also by capturing 
entitlement rules and considering the take-up of state transfers by migrants or their 
residual dependency, a proxy for the parameter φ  in the model of Section 3. When 
migrants receive more transfers than those they are entitled to, they may create 
pressures also on contributory schemes. Symmetrically, when they have a relatively 
low take-up of schemes they are formally entitled to, this creates a situation of “social 
free-riding”, in which fiscal revenues in the recipient country are inflated by taxes 
and contributions which do not actually originate transfers even when the risks they 
are supposed to face materialize.  
Table 5 reports results of probit regressions evaluating the presence of “residual 
dependency from social transfers” by non-EU citizens4. More precisely, we try to 
isolate whether the fact of being a migrant explains the take-up of a social transfer in 
addition to personal characteristics of the individual (e.g., the number of dependent 
children, educational attainments, family status, etc.) affecting the probability of 
receiving the transfer. Put it another way, we are asking the following question: 
would a non-EU citizen be more or less likely to be dependent on a given type of 
social transfers than a EU citizen with the same characteristics? 
 
 
                                                        
4 The full regressions replicating the implicit allocation mechanism of cash transfers are reported 
in Tables A2 and A3 in Annex A. They explain up to 70 per cent of the total variance in take-up 
rates. Once more, the skill level of both natives and migrants is a key factor affecting the 
probability of receiving cash transfers. 
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Table 5 
Residual Dependency on State Transfers of Migrants 
     Extra EU25 
Austria Contributory  -0.01 [0.68] 
 non contributory  -0.07 [3.33]*** 
Belgium Contributory  -0.20 [12.39]*** 
 non contributory  0.10 [2.90]*** 
Denmark Contributory  0.07 [3.81]*** 
 non contributory  0.07 [1.42] 
Finland Contributory  0.02 [0.76] 
 non contributory  0.16 [2.62]*** 
France Contributory  -0.11 [7.29]*** 
 non contributory  0.30 [10.13]*** 
Germany+ Contributory  0.05 [2.37]** 
 non contributory  0.18 [3.73]*** 
Greece Contributory  -0.08 [4.84]*** 
 non contributory  -0.06 [3.84]*** 
Ireland Contributory  -0.18 [8.13]*** 
 non contributory  -0.04 [0.80] 
Italy Contributory  -0.01 [0.52] 
 non contributory  -0.02 [1.19] 
Luxembourg Contributory  -0.10 [5.61]*** 
 non contributory  0.09 [1.49] 
Netherlands Contributory  -0.13 [1.83]* 
 non contributory  0.42 [2.86]*** 
Portugal Contributory  -0.12 [4.02]*** 
 non contributory  -0.21 [6.15]*** 
Spain Contributory  -0.10 [5.60]*** 
 non contributory  -0.02 [2.17]** 
Sweden Contributory  -0.25 [11.65]*** 
 non contributory  0.03 [0.70] 
United Kingdom Contributory  -0.14 [7.98]*** 
  non contributory   -0.23 [9.64]*** 
   Source: EU-SILC 2004-6 
Note: z statistics in brackets, * significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** 
significant at 1 per cent. The regression includes the following covariates: gender, age (linear 
and quadratic terms), dummies for the number of children, family size, educational 
attainments, house ownership, labour market status of the respondent and of the partner. See 
Table A2 and A3 in the Annex A. 
 
Table 5 points to residual dependency of migrants on non-contributory transfers in 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and The Netherlands and low take-up rates for 
this kind of transfers in Greece, Portugal, Spain and the UK. Most countries denote a 
low take-up of contributory transfers of migrants, the exception being in this case 
Denmark and Germany. 
 
Tito Boeri 
 
                                                                                                                                      
21 
4.3  Selection effects 
The model in Section 3 also suggests that natives may be concerned about the self-
selection of low-skilled migrants driven by “welfare magnets”. This risk can be 
perceived especially by native low skilled workers who are particularly vulnerable to 
the downscaling of welfare programmes.  
As long as the presence of a generous welfare system self-selects migrants who are 
more exposed to unemployment risk, notably low-skilled migrants, immigration can 
put pressures also on contributory systems. However, eligibility to contributory 
transfers typically requires a minimum contribution period, preventing immigrants 
to draw benefits before a vesting period, which can be relatively long (e.g., in the 
case of pensions can be up to five years). 
Skilled migrants are certainly not randomly allocated across the EU. There are 
striking disparities among EU countries regarding the educational attainments of 
migrants vis-à-vis the natives. Table 6 displays the evolution of the relative share of 
skilled workers (persons with tertiary educational attainments) in the non-EU 
migrant population vis-à-vis the native population, a proxy for the parameter γ in 
the model of section 3. Data are drawn from the Docquier (2006) dataset on the 
stocks of migrants and natives by education and from the Barro-Lee(2000) dataset on 
educational attainments. 
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Table 6 
Relative of share of skilled workers among migrant and natives  
Ratio of the share of individuals with tertiary education in the migrant population 
and the same share in the native population 
Country 
Relative Share 
‘90 
Relative Share 
‘00 
∆ 
2000-1990 
Spain 2,19 1,15 -1,05 
Portugal 1,85 1,03 -0,82 
Greece 1,79 0,99 -0,80 
Italy 1,60 0,91 -0,69 
Germany 1,98 1,36 -0,61 
Norway 1,48 1,05 -0,43 
Ireland 2,83 2,50 -0,33 
Netherlands 1,08 0,87 -0,21 
France 1,32 1,12 -0,20 
Belgium 1,05 0,87 -0,18 
Austria 0,77 0,71 -0,06 
Finland 1,03 1,01 -0,02 
Denmark 0,78 0,81 0,03 
United Kingdom 1,67 1,83 0,16 
Sweden 1,11 1,29 0,18 
  Sources: Own extrapolations on data from Docquier (2006) and Barro-Lee (2000) 
 
The table points to quite striking differences in the relative skill content of migration 
across EU countries, suggesting that skills of migrants are not randomly allocated in 
Europe. A rather common trend is a deterioration of the relative skill content of 
migration to Europe (third column).  
How do the observed cross-country differences in the relative skill content of 
migration correlate with differences in the generosity of welfare system? Table 7 
offers a panel regression of the relative shares displayed in Table 6 against several 
measures of the generosity of social policies in the OECD countries5. The first two 
regressions allow for regional dummies (Continental, Eastern, Northern and 
Southern Europe, North-America, Asia and Oceania) while the last two are in 
differences, hence control for fixed country effects. 
 
                                                        
5 One may argue that differences in the educational attainments of migrants vs. natives across 
European countries reflect differences in the quality of the workforce in the source countries, 
which are history dependent. But the above pattern survives even after controlling for the origin 
of immigrants. For instance, Boeri et al. (2002) compared the two main recipients of African 
migrants, namely France and the U.K., finding that in France roughly 33 % of Africans had not 
completed secondary education, vs. only 18 % of Africans in the U.K. 
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Table 7 
Relative skill composition of migrants and the generosity of social policies in the OECD 
 
  
Dependent variable: 
Relative skill ratio 
Dependent variable: 
Difference in 
Relative skill ratio 
(2000-1990) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Active labor market programmes   0.386*  0.141 
  (1.97)  (0.547) 
Housing policies  0.113  -0.491 
  (0.064)  (1.04) 
Unemployment benefits  0.028  0.301** 
  (0.31)  (2.37) 
Total social expenditure -0.085*** -0.091*** -0.065** -0.113*** 
 (-5.23) (-4.64) (-2.69) (-3.59) 
Constant 2.092*** 2.442*** -0.071 -0.044 
 (6.73) (5.85) (-0.92) (-0.49) 
Regional dummies yes yes no no 
Observations 57 45 27 21 
R squared 0.48 0.46 0.22 0.54 
Source: Oecd and own elaborations on data from Docquier (2006) 
Notes: In columns (3) & (4) independent variables are given by  differences between  2000 and 
1990. 
Consistently with the simple model outlined in section 3, Table 7 suggests that 
higher social expenditure is generally associated with a lower relative skill content of 
migration. However, not all social transfers affect skills in the same direction. Active 
labour market policies and unemployment benefits, in particular, my also affect 
positively the relative skill content of migration.  
The presence of more unskilled immigrants in the countries and time-periods with 
higher social spending does not necessarily imply that self-selection is at work. As 
suggested by the political economic models by Benhabib (1996) and Dolmas and 
Huffman (2003), the causality may also go from the skill composition of migrants to 
welfare policies rather than the other way round.  Cross sectional data can hardly 
shed light on the direction of causality.   
A recent study by De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2008) drawing on ECHP data found that 
cross-country asymmetries in the generosity of social welfare systems can increase 
significantly the scale of migration flows, having also some impact on the skill 
composition of migration. In particular, De Giorgi and Pellizzari found that an 
increase by one standard deviation in the generosity of welfare benefits (involving an 
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increase of their amount by roughly 3,000 € per year in a country) increases the 
probability of receiving migrants by some 3%. This is a sizeable effect. All the 
interactions with personal characteristics are not significant except the skill and the 
gender interactions, pointing to some positive selection of the unskilled and negative 
self-selection of women in countries with a generous welfare system (perhaps be-
cause migrant women fill the gaps of social security in providing childcare and 
support  to the elderly). Unfortunately, we could not have access to the panel of EU-
Silc, hence we cannot carry out the same type of analysis with this data source that 
provides a much deeper description of social transfers received by individuals. 
 
4.4.  Identity and preferences for redistribution 
As suggested by our findings above, non-contributory transfers involve in several 
countries significant residual dependency with migrants receiving more than 
implied by the implicit allocation rule of these transfers. Under these circumstances, 
preferences over redistribution are likely to play a major role in the perception of 
migration. Unfortunately there is limited information on preferences over 
redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2009, for a review) and even this scant 
evidence is available only for a few countries.  
Table 8 below reports the fraction of natives who agree with the statement that 
“Governments should take more responsibility to ensure that everybody is provided 
for” together with two measures offering a proxy for the percentage of migrants 
perceived as belonging to the same community, that is the fraction of natives 
reporting to identify themselves as citizens of the world (second column) and the 
fraction of migrants reporting to identify themselves as citizens of the country of 
destination (third column).  Finally the fourth column reports the “intersection” 
between the first two columns, that is natives who are both favorable to 
redistribution and citizens of the world. These measures offer proxies for the 
parameter (1-φ) of the model in Section 3. 
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Table 8 
Identity and support to redistributive policies 
 
 
  
Support to 
redistributive 
policies 
Cosmopolitanism:  
I see myself as a 
world citizen 
I see myself as a 
citizen of the 
country 
(migrants) 
Cosmopolitanism 
and support to 
redistributive 
policies 
All 41,01% 65,42% 89,50% 24,98% 
Italy 44,21% 61,85% 57,11% 26,98% 
Spain 50,50% 78,39% 94,80% 40,35% 
Sweden 17,61% 85,24% 84,27% 16,01% 
Finland 26,98% 64,12% 57,15% 17,45% 
Germany 52,88% 50,37% 58,03% 24,38% 
 
Source: WVS 2005 
The key message here is that preferences for redistribution are only partly associated 
with cosmopolitan attitudes of natives: the intersection among the two sets involves 
a relatively small component of the population in the host country (fourth column). 
Thus, it is possible that migrants are indeed perceived as non deserving the same 
redistribution which is desirable for the members of the same community. There is 
no reciprocity in this sentiment: a majority of migrants are indeed perceiving 
themselves as citizens of the host country (third column).  
Overall, there is evidence that migrants are overrepresented among recipients of 
non-contributory systems, and in countries with a rather generous welfare state (the 
Nordics and Continental EU countries) this overrepresentation is not only explained 
by their personal characteristics, such as the presence of many dependent family 
members exposing them more than natives to unemployment and poverty risks. 
Lower skills are always associated with a higher fiscal burden of migration and the 
relative small content of migration has been diminished notably in those countries 
with a more generous social policy system. Identity considerations may also play a 
role in growing concerns of Europeans about the fiscal costs of migration: a relatively 
small fraction of EU citizens are at the same time cosmopolites and favourable to 
redistribution. Thus, all the various factors discussed in the simple model presented 
in Section 3 would seem to be at work in Europe. 
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5. Policy issues 
European Governments are reacting to growing concerns of their citizens with 
respect to migration, by tightening migration policies. Table 9 displays the evolution 
of a summary indicator of the strictness of migration policies (see Annex B for details 
as to how the indicator is defined).   
Table 9 
Strictness of migration policies in Europe (1994-2005) 
  
Strictness Index 
    Total ∆ High skilled 
Austria 1994 2,33  
 2005 2,79  
Denmark 1994 2,67 0 
 2005 3,21 0 
Finland 1994 2,17  
 2005 2,79  
France 1994 1,33 0 
 2005 1,50 0 
Germany 1994 2,50 0 
 2005 2,57 -1 
Greece 1994 2,83  
 2005 2,71  
Ireland 1994 2,75  
 2005 2,93  
Italy 1994 3,00  
 2005 3,14  
Netherlands 1994 2,75 0 
 2005 3,00 -1 
Portugal 1994 3,00  
 2005 3,07  
Spain 1994 3,08  
 2005 3,21  
United Kingdom 1994 2,25 0 
 2005 2,91 -1 
   Notes: Total Strictness index comes from fRDB Reforms dataset (available at 
http://www.frdb.org/documentazione/scheda.php?id=55&doc_pk=9027). High skilled 
strictness index is calculated using  Mayda (2004) and fRDB Reforms database. A full 
description is provided in Annex B. 
 
Limited to some country we also have a variable displaying changes in the stance of 
migration policies limited to the highly skilled workers. This information is provided 
in the last column on the right-hand-side of Table 9.  
Table 9 suggests that all EU15 countries except Greece have been tightening 
migration policies. Some liberalisation has taken place limited to highly skilled 
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migrants (persons with tertiary or postgraduate education). The mounting concerns 
about the economic and social impact of migration documented in Section 2 are now 
pressing Governments to make migration policies even more restrictive.  
The issue is that migration restrictions are difficult to enforce, and hence may end-up 
substituting legal with illegal migration, which makes the fiscal position of migrants 
even worse. Illegal migrants are not in a position to pay taxes and social security 
contributions while are still entitled to free or subsidised health care and education 
for their children. More importantly, in integrated labour markets like the EU it is 
very difficult to enforce different migration policies. Migrants can transit in the 
countries with milder restrictions to finally settle in the country with a generous 
social welfare, notably moving across countries subscribing the Schengen 
agreements.  
Ways out of these policy dilemmas can be possibly found by considering other policy 
instruments in combination with migration policies. We consider below the 
following three policy options: 
1. closing the welfare door to migrants, 
2. introducing a `points-based system' (PBS), rewarding skilled migration; 
3. harmonising safety nets at the EU level 
 
5.1. Closing the Welfare Door? 
Restricting welfare access seems to address the core concern of public opinion in the 
EU about welfare abuse by migrants6. Closing access to welfare cuts across these 
concerns, preventing moral hazard problems to arise with respect to the immigrants. 
A policy explicitly preventing abuse of welfare by migrants is deemed to buy 
popular support to more realistic migration policies in individual EU countries. This 
                                                        
6
  See also Dustmann et al., 2003. 
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is the rationale for the Hans-Werner Sinn (2004a, 2004b) proposal to temporarily 
close the welfare door to migrants.  
As suggested by the evidence reviewed in this paper, closing the welfare door would 
reduce the proportion of unskilled workers in migration inflows. A closing the 
welfare door policy, however, would postpone the assimilation of migrants who are 
already in the country or who would come in any event. Thus, it may paradoxically 
increase the negative externalities on the natives of immigration to rigid labour 
markets, by pushing many migrants into illegal activities. 
Closing the welfare door may not be a credible policy option under the sizeable 
immigration flows taking place in Europe. The US experience is revealing in this 
respect. In 1996, the welfare system was partly decentralized to the states and 
limitations were introduced to access to welfare benefits for legal immigrants. For 
instance, legal non-asylum immigrants who arrived in the country after August 1996 
were barred from receiving food stamps or using Medicaid for 5 years. The 
proponents of this reform were hoping that a more decentralised system would 
make the states more cautious in providing expensive welfare benefits to 
immigrants. The reform failed on both accounts (Boeri et al., 2002). Since 1996, the 
provision excluding immigrants from some welfare services has been challenged in 
the courts. By 1997, the Congress started repealing the tougher provisions. Finally, 
the states felt the political pressure to maintain the benefits at the previous levels 
under the federal system with this being particularly evident in high-migration states 
like California; immigrants account for more than 15 percent of the Californian 
electorate. A decentralized system that strongly discriminates against immigrants 
can face political resistance, is easily challengeable in courts and is thus likely to 
ultimately revert to the previous system. 
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5.2. Adopting a PBS? 
A points based system is a method to rank applications for residence and work 
permits. It has been adopted by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and, in Europe, by 
Switzerland. The UK is likewise introducing a PBS. In this system, each application is 
allocated a score based on explicit criteria which typically reward educational 
attainment, experience, and language abilities. "Bonus points" can also be given for 
employment in occupations and regions where there is a shortage of workers. A 
point-based-system adopted by Europe vis-à-vis third country nationals may 
encourage more skilled migration not only in relative, but also in absolute terms, 
enhancing the growth potential of migration and reducing negative externalities via 
unemployment. An additional advantage of a PBS is that it could simplify migration 
regulations, e.g. removing the need for ad-hoc policies for highly-skilled migrants 
and integrating asylum policies into a broader framework by, for example, granting 
"humanitarian" points. Finally, most EU countries are already introducing de facto 
selective migration policies, as also documented by Table 9: reforms are mostly 
reducing strictness for highly skilled workers. A PBS would make policies more 
transparent, providing better signals to migrants choosing the country of destination.  
But how effective are points systems in selecting migrants?  Some crude indications 
may come by comparing the distribution of 2004 IALS (International Adult Literacy 
Scores) scores of migrants vs. natives in a country without a points system 
(Germany) and in a country with a PBS in place, like Canada (Figure 2). The 
difference is quite striking in terms of skill levels, both absolute (the average IALS for 
migrants was roughly 300 in Canada compared with 250 in Germany) and relative to 
natives. In Germany the skill distribution of migrants is visibly tilted to the left, while 
in Canada it almost perfectly overlaps with the distribution among natives. How-
ever, there may be many other potential explanations for the observed differences in 
the composition by skill of migration to Canada and Germany, e.g., differences in 
mobility costs, and the generosity of welfare states.  
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Difference-in-differences analyses can take into account of these cross-sectional 
differences, insofar as they are time-invariant. Thus, we analysed changes in the skill 
composition of migration in Canada after the introduction of the point system and 
compared these variations with evolutions in the US, that did not adopt a PBS.  This 
exercise confirms the effectiveness of the PBS in selecting migrants. In Canada the 
fraction of migrants with tertiary education increased by 5 percentage points from 
1987 to 2002, while it decreased in the US over the same period of time. Also in 
Australia the share of workers with tertiary or higher level of education increased 
substantially after the adoption of a point system and there are indications of similar 
developments in New Zealand after introducing a PBS. Thus, a PBS is likely to 
counteract the self-selection of low-skilled migrants in countries with a generous 
welfare state. 
An additional reason to introduce a PBS is that economic theory suggests that the 
skill content of migration affects the state budget via its effects on economic growth. 
Endogenous growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) imply that immigration 
contributes to economic growth in the recipient country insofar as it increases the 
share of skilled workers in the population. By increasing its per capita human capital 
endowments, the immigration country can support stronger growth rates in GDP per 
capita, rather than simply experiencing a once-for-all increase in GDP. By the same 
token, migration having a lower skill content than the native labour force reduces the 
potential growth rate.  
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Figure 2 
Distribution of average IALS scores in Germany (left) and Canada (right) 
 
       
 
Source:  Ials 2004  
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There is, however, an important drawback of a PBS -- its negative effects on growth, 
via the so-called brain drain, in the sending country -- which may in turn increase 
migration of unskilled workers in the future. However, selective immigration 
policies increase the individual incentives to invest in human capital in the sending 
countries, so that the impact of migration on human capital formation in the country 
of origin is ambiguous7. Moreover, since migration to Europe is mainly temporary, 
human capital acquired in the country of destination could be subsequently 
transferred to the country of origin promoting growth in the sending region. 
 
5.3. Harmonising minimum welfare across jurisdictions 
The above policy options have to do with migration policy or the treatment of 
migrants with respect to their access to social transfers rather than to the design of 
social policies. Another option involves the harmonization of minimum welfare 
standards (Bean et al., 1998, Bertola et al., 2001) or a EU-wide minimum welfare floor 
(see Atkinson, 1998). The rationale for this policy is that it would prevent welfare 
shopping and potential “races-to-the bottom” in social welfare provision fostered by 
fiscal spillovers across jurisdictions.  
European countries differ quite substantially in terms of the generosity of their 
welfare systems, and, as shown in Section 4, these differences are correlated with the 
skill composition of migration.  
The potential for a race to the bottom across jurisdictions can be better characterized 
by a variant of the 1951 Roy model. Suppose that a migrant is considering two 
alternative destinations, say country 1 or country 2, and that the only relevant 
dimension affecting the potential earnings of migrants is skill. The choice faced by 
the migrant is illustrated in Figure 3, displaying, on the horizontal axis, the skill level 
of a given individual, and, on the vertical axis, her earnings, net of migration costs.  
                                                        
7
 Evidence on the brain-drain effects of migration is, indeed, far from conclusive (Docquier – 
Rappoport, 2004). 
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As shown by the panel on the left-hand-side of Figure 3, the most skilled workers 
(those with skills higher than s∗) will go to country 1, where their skills are better 
rewarded, while the least skilled will go to country 2, as they are paid more therein. 
Figure 3 
The choice of the destination country and the welfare floor 
 
 
 
Suppose now that country 1 introduces a minimum guaranteed income scheme, 
preventing natives’ and migrants’ incomes to fall below a given poverty threshold, 
say y . Now also some of the unskilled (those with skills lower than s∗∗) will migrate 
to country 1. Therefore, the presence of a welfare state affects the skill composition of 
migration, and may induce some workers not to go where their skills are mostly 
productive, exerting a welfare magnet effect. 
Because of this fiscal externality across jurisdictions, countries with a rich welfare state 
are bound to attract more migrants than countries with a poor safety net or no safety 
net at all. Moreover, it will be mainly the unskilled migration to be diverted by 
asymmetries among potential destinations of migrants in the generosity of the 
welfare state. Larger inflows of unskilled migrants are also bound to increase 
earnings inequalities in the country attracting more migrants. This may further 
Income Income 
Country 1 Country 1 
Country 2 Country 2 
s* s* s**
 
y 
Skilled migrants go to country 1 
Unskilled migrants go to country 2 
Safety net in country 1: 
also the least skilled go to country 1 
Skill Level 
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increase, via second round effects, social expenditure in the recipient. Although, as 
shown in Section 4, there is limited evidence that “welfare magnets” are operating in 
Europe, these effects are perceived by public opinion, fearing a race to the bottom in 
welfare provision in order to prevent self-selection to penalize the most generous 
countries.  
All EU countries, except Greece and Italy, have some safety net in place. Yet, 
coordinating these floors is not an easy task. The very different income levels of EU 
countries and regions imply that some inter-jurisdictional redistribution is hardly 
avoidable. Minimum-welfare transfers and services could be co-financed by a 
specific budget line item at the EU level. How large could this budget line be? De 
Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006) estimated that a Minimum Guaranteed Income (MGI) 
scheme harmonised at 430 net monthly Euros at purchasing-power-parity for a 
single without children (this is roughly the average of the MGIs offered in the EU-15 
in 2000) would cost about 30 billion Euros, which is about ¾ of the current 
expenditure for social assistance and housing at the EU level. This sum is 
significantly smaller than the resources currently allotted to Structural, Cohesion, or 
Common Agricultural Policy funds (which currently amount to some 60 billion 
euro).  Schmitter (1999) also noted that 50 billion Euros would more than suffice to 
lift all EU-15 citizens out of poverty.  
An EU minimum welfare program could have negative effects on employment. Some 
design features of this harmonised MGI are very important in this respect. In order to 
prevent welfare-shopping, the minimum standard needs to be specified in absolute 
terms (rather than in relation to local incomes). At the same time, cost-of-living 
differentials and the character of social-service provision should be taken into 
account by the definition of country- and region-specific minimum levels of welfare 
provision. Uniform minimum absolute welfare levels would indeed have the most 
negative employment effects in relatively poor countries or regions. Minimum 
assistance levels may then be specified in purchasing power parity terms, and would 
be much lower in Poland than in Germany. This is a difficult exercise but, to the 
extent that prices of non-traded goods are lower in the same locations where labor 
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productivity and wages are low, would go some way towards reducing disincentive 
effects on local labor supply.  
At the national level, this MGI could be possibly integrated with Employment 
Conditional-Incentives (ECIs), reducing marginal effective tax rates above the MGI.  
Thus, the integration of the MGI within the national tax-and-benefit system is very 
important to minimize adverse effects on employment.  
The definition and specification of European welfare minima might instead be a 
suitable task for the European Commission, which could be tasked with monitoring 
local welfare programs to ensure that no European citizen, regardless of her or his 
residency, employment history, and nationality is allowed to fall through the cracks 
of an EU-wide safety net. The level of this EU-wide poverty prevention programs 
along the trade-off between poverty prevention and employment is an essentially 
political decision. As argued by Atkinson (1998), a clear commitment to an official 
policy in this respect would have beneficial politico-economic implications within 
each country. Inasmuch as unhindered mobility of persons is a basic building block 
of the EU, however, the issue must be discussed at the central level: to ensure that 
actual or potential problems are addressed clearly and to minimize political 
distortions, the relevant funds should be clearly isolated in the EU budget. Central 
co-financing of social assistance programs would also provide means for enforcement 
of EU-wide guidelines: as in the US TANF program, the availability of central 
matching funds should be conditional on satisfactory implementation of minimum 
welfare provisions, and activation schemes, and the enforcement power afforded by 
this financial lever should be exercised by central supervisory bodies.   
It is also essential in this context to reach agreement on the definition of EU 
citizenship, especially as regards entitlements of non-EU immigrants and refugees. In 
the spirit of social cohesion, all EU legal residents could be fully integrated in the 
minimal, centrally co-funded welfare program envisioned here. To address the 
obvious co-ordination problems arising when EU-wide citizenship entitlements are 
granted by local constituencies, entry into the EU should be centrally regulated, as is 
envisaged (albeit after a long transition process) by the provisions added in 
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Amsterdam under Title IV of the EU Consolidated Treaties (European Commission, 
1998a). 
6. Final Remarks 
There is a widespread and growing perception in Europe that migrants are a fiscal 
burden and abuse its generous welfare states. This view induces negative 
perceptions about migration to Europe which is almost unavoidably taking place. 
The poorest and the least educated individuals of the EU are those most concerned 
about the fiscal implications of migration. Negative perceptions are milder among 
skilled workers and natives having migrants as relatives or friends. This suggests 
that economics and psychology are more important than ideology in explaining this 
growing dissatisfaction of Europeans with respect to migrants. 
In this paper we developed a simple model accounting for the various channels by 
which migration can affect the perceived fiscal impact of migration. Based on this 
framework we then analysed all the data sources available to evaluate the 
importance of each of these factors. We found that migrants are overrepresented 
among beneficiaries of non-contributory transfers, and some evidence of “residual 
dependency” of migrants, thereby they receive transfers more than natives when 
control is made of their educational attainments and family characteristics, notably in 
the countries with the richest welfare state.  More social spending would seem also to 
be associated with a lower skill content of migration which, in turn, negatively 
affects the net fiscal position of migrants. 
Growing negative perceptions about migrants are supporting stricter and stricter 
migration policies in the EU. However, there is no a one-size fits all policy in this 
context. The risk is that a potential vicious circle is set in motion in which tighter 
migration restrictions induce illegal migration, preventing migrants to contribute, as 
they could, to social security, and hence fulfilling perceptions of migration as a fiscal 
burden. 
Three policy options could prevent this vicious circle from the start. The first policy 
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restricts welfare access by migrants, preventing both abuse and self-selection, but 
weakening the anti-poverty functions of social policies and postponing the 
assimilation of the migrants who are already in. The second policy addresses only 
self-selection as it adopts selective migration policies, rewarding educational 
attainments. A points-based system, in particular, would counteract an over-
representation of unskilled workers in the countries with a generous safety net. The 
third policy also deals with self-selection only: it co-ordinates safety nets across 
countries to prevent potential races to the bottom in minimum standards. Based on 
the (admittedly scant) evidence on the enforceability and effectiveness of these three 
sets of policies, we conclude that the second and third options are to be preferred to 
the first one.  More research on the enforcement of these policies is warranted that 
would guide more informed choices over highly controversial issues. 
Whatever the choice of Governments will be along these domains, there is no doubt 
that social policies and migration policies need to be more closely integrated.   
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ANNEX A 
 
Figure A1 
Normalized distributions of perceptions about migrants  
(ESS, various waves). 
 
 
0
2
4
6
De
n
sit
y
1 2 3 4 5
welfare
0
2
4
6
De
n
sit
y
0
1
2
3
4
5
De
n
sit
y
1 2 3 4 5
Overall economy
0
1
2
3
4
5
De
n
sit
y
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
1 2 3 4 5
wage
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
1 2 3 4 5
poor
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
0
2
4
6
De
ns
ity
1 2 3 4 5
jobs
0
2
4
6
De
ns
ity
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
1 2 3 4 5
crime
0
1
2
3
4
D
en
si
ty
Tito Boeri 
 
                                                                                                                                      
41 
Table A1 
Net fiscal position of Households: incidence of individual characteristics 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
AT BE DE+ DK ES FI FR IE LU NO SE UK
EU25 Migrant 
House
1066,6 3809,16  -461,78 688,76 16821,53 419,56 1852,13 3353,49 2936,72 -837,71 921,52
[0,80] [2,49]**  [0,54] [0,31] [1,43] [0,68] [1,71]* [4,80]*** [2,28]** [0,93] [0,63]
Extra EU25 
Migrant House
1914,76 53182,25 746,16 -4312,91 2147,91 -4790,31 -242,97 -4162,06 3727,97 -1210,19 -1180,55 3942,71
[3,97]*** [1,89]* [0,89] [6,30]*** [3,80]*** [5,86]*** [0,45] [3,35]*** [2,42]** [1,16] [0,86] [2,81]***
Mixed 
Household
3582,3 -756,34 546,81 794,38 1767,21 -959,6 2080,39 -1547,57 2798,16 1340,34 -1124,11 2850,88
[4,77]*** [0,96] [0,55] [1,03] [1,44] [1,67]* [3,04]*** [1,66]* [2,30]** [1,88]* [1,36] [2,53]**
Male -745,13 3165,56 -427,15 1065,55 89,7 358,94 -615,7 -143,06 2448,04 770,03 372,32 35,1
[2,17]** [2,94]*** [1,48] [4,55]*** [0,33] [1,55] [2,15]** [0,32] [2,49]** [2,21]** [1,42] [0,09]
Age 426,53 1790,33 580,75 -68,6 359,06 462,74 613,59 484,19 1353,97 353,94 261,45 718,99
[10,16]*** [6,02]*** [14,47]*** [2,10]** [8,40]*** [14,14]*** [15,80]*** [9,84]*** [13,09]*** [7,52]*** [7,09]*** [12,16]***
Age^2 -6,19 -18,93 -8,61 -0,88 -4,74 -6,24 -7,8 -5,79 -16,42 -5,28 -3,4 -9,02
[15,31]*** [6,04]*** [21,87]*** [2,68]*** [11,64]*** [19,36]*** [20,98]*** [13,40]*** [16,38]*** [11,02]*** [9,26]*** [15,16]***
Secondary 
Education
-1287,93 1088,56 -1562,7 119,01 -946,06 442,78 -1958,79 -305,16 -2445,96 299,13 1127,4 -2091,79
[4,89]*** [0,87] [5,65]*** [0,64] [3,34]*** [2,10]** [8,09]*** [0,84] [3,92]*** [0,98] [4,27]*** [5,83]***
Tertiary 
Education
777,64 8448,16 -764,67 3907,77 942,27 5310,38 3915,59 8070,79 4732,94 5463,95 7431,96 2734,85
[1,97]** [4,41]*** [2,47]** [14,36]*** [2,75]*** [20,76]*** [9,79]*** [12,89]*** [4,73]*** [12,51]*** [18,58]*** [4,28]***
High income 
(before 
transfers)
21429,97 25663,52 18918,46 21819,8 12044,18 23459,03 24047,17 20620,69 28332,72 25895,01 26916,31 26001,06
[70,55]*** [17,84]*** [72,49]*** [61,39]*** [43,39]*** [66,49]*** [84,91]*** [49,60]*** [38,60]*** [69,56]*** [75,47]*** [52,86]***
Low income 
(b,t)
-16871,7 -18974 -18478,1 -20490,1 -8108,95 -17454,4 -17868,5 -10427 -19421,6 -24443,4 -20819,5 -13990,3
[59,70]*** [15,54]*** [65,90]*** [93,04]*** [25,96]*** [100,75]*** [63,15]*** [27,97]*** [27,97]*** [85,52]*** [89,82]*** [40,24]***
House Owner 1189,53 508,27 1222,47 2861,41 41,94 1894,42 1625,59 2107,57 -437,21 858,08 2272,22 3274,36
[4,18]*** [0,86] [6,02]*** [14,73]*** [0,12] [6,55]*** [7,04]*** [5,36]*** [0,77] [2,69]*** [8,95]*** [11,38]***
Single -831,65 -4001,83 1668,59 1367,93 2643,87 -1004,11 901,2 931,19 3300,16 1105,02 -6772,4 -177,57
[1,04] [1,36] [2,48]** [1,77]* [4,70]*** [0,87] [1,50] [0,93] [1,98]** [1,33] [10,35]*** [0,11]
Single with 
child
-3492,02 -932,98 -2891,15 -1215,39 -162,38 -4741,12 -639,56 -3465,21 -384,51 -3324,35 -5098,06 -6815,4
[3,94]*** [0,46] [4,84]*** [1,62] [0,28] [5,68]*** [1,09] [3,89]*** [0,21] [3,87]*** [8,22]*** [4,57]***
1 child 1996,15 -1141,92 1101,04 4111,16 3504,05 7504,46 2905,47 4846,24 2986,75 5566,11 4997,44 1401,33
[2,96]*** [1,09] [1,80]* [5,54]*** [7,79]*** [7,35]*** [5,71]*** [3,72]*** [2,15]** [6,88]*** [9,56]*** [1,23]
2 children 1977,94 -2895,28 377,51 5196,56 2227,72 6306,18 3055,54 2350,07 4655,82 5986,65 5490,77 7119,42
[2,45]** [1,89]* [0,63] [5,60]*** [2,74]*** [9,10]*** [3,53]*** [2,63]*** [2,70]*** [6,07]*** [6,06]*** [3,89]***
3 children 865,78 2145,81 -9692,76 -21033,4 6649,06 -1546,21 -5062,4 2141,43 4809,72 3456,86 655,18 2023,64
[0,25] [0,30] [2,69]*** [1,81]* [4,59]*** [0,20] [0,91] [0,95] [0,71] [0,44] [0,22] [0,23]
4 children 3039,9 -9866,17 -1642,48 7031,31  4877,22 3642,18 -5751,79 1729,83 4493,14 10389,84 39301,51
[1,25] [2,60]*** [0,89] [2,23]**  [3,06]*** [1,26] [2,16]** [0,67] [1,73]* [4,27]*** [1,53]
5+ children -10383,2 -21365,7 12003,84 17077,49  7366,83 -10458,9 1657,09  4595,18 -19369,2  
[8,96]*** [2,39]** [3,76]*** [6,34]***  [2,25]** [5,74]*** [0,38]  [2,11]** [3,41]***  
2 household 
members
-1792,42 5363,29 -268,71 2684,52 2069,37 -1936,33 -1383,66 -3510,82 -557,34 402,57 -4937,78 -2567,78
[2,17]** [1,41] [0,40] [3,52]*** [3,88]*** [1,74]* [2,35]** [3,69]*** [0,36] [0,48] [7,63]*** [1,62]
3 hh members
-955,3 8441,37 179,79 8479,67 999,47 -668,95 505,45 -5340,54 -1934,53 5950,91 -1711,15 -860,5
[0,94] [2,14]** [0,20] [6,82]*** [1,71]* [0,59] [0,59] [4,33]*** [0,93] [4,78]*** [1,78]* [0,42]
4 hh members
1240,19 13095,37 2680,28 6987,47 2589,35 2354,97 3255,88 -3643,98 2440,85 6082,13 -296,96 -228,75
[0,85] [3,68]*** [2,08]** [4,69]*** [3,78]*** [1,03] [3,07]*** [2,00]** [0,89] [3,90]*** [0,25] [0,07]
5 hh members
3303,67 17458,01 7616,6 22409,49 2525,62 918,3 1911,02 -3061,91 4617,81 8036,88 972,28 -582,24
[2,09]** [3,58]*** [2,11]** [2,49]** [2,55]** [0,54] [1,25] [1,41] [1,46] [3,24]*** [0,49] [0,20]
6 hh members
4716,7 14582,57 7713,94 12487,33 177,44 7326,38 9225,74 -2528,67 2610,26 14817,11 8534,98 8,48
[2,80]*** [3,94]*** [5,40]*** [6,98]*** [0,09] [3,01]*** [6,55]*** [1,20] [0,81] [7,87]*** [5,21]*** [0,00]
7 hh members
11772,61 29546,97 14390,23 15402,6 1544,96 13307,66 11970,72 -881,89 9027,58 20627,51 13431,85 268,97
[5,86]*** [7,00]*** [8,50]*** [4,65]*** [0,34] [5,06]*** [6,83]*** [0,38] [2,50]** [8,84]*** [6,11]*** [0,08]
Densly 
populated area
47,15 -69,64 632,97 1463,59 165,91 1459,06 -189,37 93,19 -144,45 1869,85 384,01 -444,08
[0,15] [0,11] [2,98]*** [6,21]*** [0,63] [4,61]*** [0,74] [0,16] [0,23] [5,81]*** [0,73] [1,15]
Thinly 
populated area
-988,71 -762,42 -526,54 -1177,08 -155,36 -767,59 -329,98 -1598,93 -1112,45 31,44 -2751,59 2706,81
[3,56]*** [0,86] [2,01]** [5,84]*** [0,57] [3,71]*** [1,13] [3,80]*** [1,48] [0,10] [7,46]*** [1,15]
Year dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country 
dummies
Regional 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3128,14 -34368,2 4562,59 14414,69 -6086,82 1023,32 -4283,63 -11096 -26115,7 4811,71 12339,69 -9550,8
[2,32]** [5,34]*** [2,83]*** [13,84]*** [3,98]*** [0,69] [2,71]*** [6,32]*** [9,07]*** [3,64]*** [12,16]*** [4,26]***
Observations 17475 10823 30173 21096 12146 37267 32687 18815 12663 20177 20360 20030
R-squared 0,66 0,15 0,65 0,67 0,6 0,59 0,6 0,45 0,62 0,63 0,65 0,41
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NO PT SE UK
-0,082 -0,052 0,010 -0,032 -0,110 -0,063 -0,046 -0,125 -0,107 -0,040 -0,038 -0,123 -0,180 0,003
[3.21]*** [4.03]*** [0.31] [1.81]* [3.01]*** [3.72]*** [1.39] [8.44]*** [3.53]*** [4.15]*** [1.45] [2.63]*** [7.81]*** [0.08]
-0,011 -0,200 0,048 0,074 -0,096 0,020 -0,109 -0,081 -0,180 -0,007 -0,103 -0,201 -0,116 -0,245 -0,161
[0.68] [12.39]*** [2.37]** [3.81]*** [5.60]*** [0.76] [7.29]*** [4.84]*** [8.13]*** [0.52] [5.61]*** [6.79]*** [4.02]*** [11.65]*** [8.21]***
0,201 0,197 0,130 -0,002 0,174 0,014 0,110 0,159 0,122 0,159 0,188 0,033 0,100 -0,003 0,106
[27.65]***[28.32]***[22.10]*** [0.26] [42.13]*** [2.57]** [20.49]***[24.64]***[18.14]***[41.10]***[19.18]*** [5.23]*** [14.80]*** [0.49] [14.38]***
-0,003 0,020 -0,018 0,010 -0,002 0,012 -0,002 -0,003 0,004 -0,024 -0,007 0,014 -0,006 0,019 -0,034
[2.44]** [19.27]***[15.54]*** [7.38]*** [3.67]*** [10.64]*** [1.87]* [3.22]*** [3.73]*** [31.60]*** [3.46]*** [12.32]*** [4.91]*** [19.21]***[19.06]***
0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001
[14.95]*** [7.44]*** [33.25]*** [4.20]*** [23.44]*** [6.68]*** [17.47]***[20.45]*** [8.42]*** [51.51]***[11.30]*** [1.60] [18.56]*** [5.79]*** [30.68]***
0,018 0,004 0,036 -0,017 -0,018 0,027 0,045 0,020 -0,037 -0,048 -0,016 -0,027 -0,031 0,077 -0,010
[2.28]** [0.59] [4.24]*** [1.99]** [3.50]*** [3.86]*** [7.58]*** [2.85]*** [4.92]*** [11.41]*** [1.72]* [3.10]*** [2.78]*** [10.17]*** [1.21]
-0,006 0,012 -0,009 -0,025 0,000 -0,017 0,056 0,061 -0,034 -0,061 -0,035 -0,097 0,065 0,030 -0,002
[0.55] [1.40] [0.92] [2.53]** [0.01] [2.12]** [7.04]*** [6.32]*** [3.82]*** [9.01]*** [2.69]*** [9.75]*** [4.79]*** [3.37]*** [0.24]
-0,261 -0,348 -0,249 -0,419 -0,234 -0,428 -0,354 -0,261 -0,218 -0,196 -0,191 -0,384 -0,148 -0,316 -0,127
[26.37]***[33.35]***[21.61]***[42.51]***[36.23]***[53.14]***[48.99]***[31.25]***[21.55]***[34.62]***[14.10]***[43.58]***[13.79]***[40.12]***[12.80]***
0,239 0,291 0,245 0,150 0,076 0,162 0,105 -0,012 0,107 0,024 0,228 0,146 0,247 0,201 0,306
[26.61]***[31.69]***[25.68]***[14.15]***[13.45]***[19.41]***[15.11]*** [1.45] [11.50]*** [4.46]*** [17.62]***[16.22]***[27.87]***[25.16]***[34.36]***
-0,064 -0,108 -0,095 -0,045 -0,019 -0,028 -0,037 0,012 -0,104 -0,001 0,008 0,029 -0,025 0,021 -0,100
[7.50]*** [13.64]***[15.27]*** [5.19]*** [2.54]** [3.75]*** [5.90]*** [1.46] [10.68]*** [0.21] [0.65] [2.77]*** [2.91]*** [3.14]*** [11.27]***
0,151 0,020 0,041 -0,192 0,082 0,075 -0,047 0,181 0,197 0,056 0,104 -0,011 0,147 -0,313 0,102
[7.33]*** [1.10] [2.34]** [7.96]*** [7.91]*** [4.30]*** [3.09]*** [9.85]*** [10.15]*** [5.21]*** [3.71]*** [0.60] [6.66]*** [16.99]*** [4.45]***
0,142 0,080 0,114 -0,040 0,198 0,106 -0,081 0,334 -0,013 0,098 0,300 0,067 0,206 -0,022 0,043
[6.68]*** [5.18]*** [8.17]*** [1.89]* [11.73]*** [6.86]*** [5.78]*** [12.29]*** [0.71] [8.02]*** [9.80]*** [3.84]*** [8.68]*** [1.44] [1.95]*
-0,037 -0,048 -0,006 -0,078 -0,023 -0,128 -0,065 -0,043 -0,050 -0,102 -0,078 -0,104 -0,072 -0,076 -0,073
[2.24]** [3.01]*** [0.34] [4.40]*** [2.50]** [9.52]*** [5.40]*** [3.24]*** [3.68]*** [12.35]*** [4.67]*** [7.80]*** [5.19]*** [5.64]*** [3.54]***
-0,057 -0,074 -0,061 -0,094 -0,020 -0,083 -0,078 -0,024 -0,091 -0,089 -0,054 -0,096 -0,074 -0,046 -0,099
[3.79]*** [4.36]*** [5.49]*** [6.05]*** [2.61]*** [6.88]*** [6.86]*** [1.94]* [7.96]*** [10.29]*** [3.28]*** [7.96]*** [5.85]*** [3.92]*** [6.81]***
-0,106 0,141 0,051 -0,071 0,244 -0,176 -0,215 0,035 0,067 -0,118 0,045 0,065
[1.09] [0.72] [0.40] [0.83] [2.11]** [1.32] [3.65]*** [0.20] [0.43] [1.09] [0.62] [0.39]
-0,065 0,433 0,065 -0,174 0,041 -0,147 -0,156 -0,300 -0,228
[0.90] [3.78]*** [0.44] [1.76]* [0.33] [2.44]** [1.93]* [2.58]*** [3.12]***
-0,072 -0,169 -0,110 -0,196 -0,104 -0,021 -0,158 -0,021 -0,012 -0,040 -0,051 -0,113 -0,037 -0,239 -0,008
[3.52]*** [9.46]*** [5.94]*** [7.80]*** [11.51]*** [1.10] [10.20]*** [1.23] [0.63] [3.46]*** [1.92]* [5.66]*** [1.59] [12.39]*** [0.34]
-0,102 -0,202 -0,195 -0,311 -0,135 -0,051 -0,226 -0,032 -0,054 -0,064 -0,049 -0,157 -0,070 -0,384 -0,065
[4.38]*** [10.77]*** [8.66]*** [10.28]***[15.03]*** [2.16]** [13.38]*** [1.69]* [2.35]** [4.88]*** [1.63] [6.54]*** [2.89]*** [16.44]*** [2.21]**
-0,137 -0,293 -0,239 -0,371 -0,175 -0,062 -0,296 -0,031 -0,021 -0,082 -0,110 -0,165 -0,085 -0,468 -0,031
[4.40]*** [10.53]*** [7.91]*** [9.12]*** [15.67]*** [2.05]** [12.64]*** [1.36] [0.73] [5.28]*** [3.07]*** [5.46]*** [3.03]*** [15.29]*** [0.77]
-0,138 -0,243 -0,218 -0,351 -0,126 -0,120 -0,243 -0,017 -0,014 -0,095 -0,084 -0,156 -0,080 -0,435 -0,077
[4.54]*** [9.20]*** [4.71]*** [6.35]*** [10.25]*** [1.78]* [9.46]*** [0.68] [0.46] [5.37]*** [2.19]** [4.05]*** [2.68]*** [13.03]*** [1.47]
-0,135 -0,286 -0,276 -0,427 -0,182 -0,114 -0,311 -0,046 -0,058 -0,101 -0,119 -0,224 -0,123 -0,526 -0,051
[4.16]*** [12.43]*** [9.55]*** [10.69]***[17.23]*** [3.41]*** [14.51]*** [1.85]* [1.83]* [5.82]*** [3.53]*** [6.97]*** [4.29]*** [17.81]*** [1.22]
-0,177 -0,300 -0,301 -0,434 -0,198 -0,170 -0,318 -0,054 -0,051 -0,128 -0,124 -0,253 -0,145 -0,550 -0,074
[5.38]*** [13.13]***[10.68]***[11.08]***[18.41]*** [4.53]*** [14.97]*** [2.17]** [1.58] [7.25]*** [3.62]*** [7.79]*** [5.17]*** [21.17]*** [1.75]*
-0,017 0,007 -0,044 -0,058 -0,023 -0,027 -0,014 -0,020 0,000 -0,038 0,034 -0,040 0,029 -0,021 0,026
[1.86]* [1.04] [6.80]*** [6.69]*** [4.80]*** [2.89]*** [2.21]** [1.21] [0.00] [9.42]*** [3.48]*** [4.68]*** [3.70]*** [2.15]** [3.07]***
0,008 -0,045 0,031 0,044 0,017 0,014 -0,007 0,003 -0,030 0,022 -0,013 -0,010 0,008 0,003 -0,040
[0.96] [3.04]*** [3.73]*** [5.48]*** [3.42]*** [1.78]* [0.97] [0.19] [3.85]*** [4.76]*** [1.18] [1.18] [1.08] [0.38] [2.46]**
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 41843 40460 75937 48740 119170 90745 76103 51344 46340 192440 30476 47259 43240 47573 48862
Pseudo R-squared 0,47 0,46 0,45 0,37 0,40 0,42 0,45 0,51 0,30 0,38 0,63 0,35 0,50 0,28 0,62
EU25 Migrant
Extra EU25 
Migrant
Male
Age
Age^2
Secondary 
Education
Tertiary Education
High income 
(before transfers)
Low income (b.t)
House Owner
Single
Single with child
1 child
2 children
3 children
5 children
2 household 
members
3 hh members
4 hh members
5 hh members
6 hh members
7 hh members
Densly populated 
area
Thinly populated 
area
Table A2  
The probability of receiving contributory-benefits: 
individual probit regressions 
 
   Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10percent; ** significant at 5percent; *** 
significant at 1percent;+ the EU-SILC does not distinguish between EU-25 and extra EU-25 
migrants;++ migrants identified by country of birth; the EU-SILC does not distinguish between 
EU-25 and extra EU-25 migrants. Low income variable defined as equivalized income lower 
than 60 percent of median income; High income variable defined as equivailzed income greater 
than 4/3 of median income. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
AT BE DE DK ES FI FR GR IE IT LU NO PT SE UK
-0,023 -0,046 0,005 -0,054 -0,141 0,034 -0,055 -0,168 -0,154 0,053 -0,150 -0,177 -0,184 -0,069
[0.53] [2.37]** [0.06] [3.76]*** [2.00]** [1.35] [1.66]* [5.21]*** [1.68]* [2.62]*** [3.84]*** [1.50] [3.90]*** [0.75]
-0,073 0,097 0,179 0,067 -0,018 0,162 0,295 -0,059 -0,038 -0,017 0,090 0,106 -0,205 0,035 -0,245
[3.33]*** [2.90]*** [3.73]*** [1.42] [2.17]** [2.62]*** [10.13]*** [3.84]*** [0.80] [1.19] [1.49] [1.81]* [6.15]*** [0.70] [9.61]***
0,002 0,037 0,032 0,060 0,004 -0,005 0,130 0,009 0,069 0,058 0,025 0,101 0,123 0,059 -0,020
[0.07] [2.10]** [1.29] [2.61]*** [0.29] [0.14] [6.41]*** [0.42] [2.96]*** [2.45]** [0.96] [3.93]*** [2.82]*** [2.38]** [0.78]
0,004 -0,018 -0,004 -0,100 -0,004 -0,035 -0,021 -0,052 -0,017 0,087 -0,048 -0,088 0,004 -0,138 -0,002
[0.25] [1.49] [0.25] [6.92]*** [0.87] [2.96]*** [2.11]** [6.04]*** [1.34] [14.34]*** [1.78]* [5.36]*** [0.24] [10.25]*** [0.11]
0,027 0,039 0,042 -0,021 0,002 -0,001 0,003 -0,010 -0,024 -0,007 0,048 0,007 0,022 -0,016 0,028
[9.45]*** [9.66]*** [14.09]*** [7.96]*** [2.97]*** [0.30] [1.86]* [8.53]*** [12.88]*** [6.95]*** [8.96]*** [2.17]** [7.72]*** [7.81]*** [14.49]***
0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
[13.15]***[11.44]***[18.90]*** [3.79]*** [7.11]*** [7.86]*** [10.86]*** [8.48]*** [13.73]*** [4.61]*** [10.61]*** [7.28]*** [12.86]*** [0.57] [19.98]***
0,037 0,016 -0,063 0,003 0,006 -0,023 -0,033 -0,043 0,017 -0,070 -0,038 -0,056 -0,012 -0,085 -0,067
[2.60]*** [1.58] [3.71]*** [0.22] [1.60] [2.13]** [3.99]*** [6.10]*** [1.48] [14.48]*** [2.08]** [3.29]*** [0.72] [6.30]*** [6.64]***
0,103 0,031 -0,031 0,065 0,017 0,017 -0,034 -0,022 -0,020 -0,096 -0,023 -0,002 -0,098 -0,022 -0,068
[6.22]*** [2.89]*** [1.79]* [4.58]*** [4.62]*** [1.46] [3.29]*** [2.66]*** [1.71]* [13.29]*** [1.07] [0.09] [6.24]*** [1.52] [6.26]***
-0,190 -0,048 -0,256 -0,178 -0,018 -0,190 -0,207 -0,027 -0,148 -0,128 -0,137 -0,195 -0,051 -0,203 -0,131
[19.64]*** [5.52]*** [29.44]***[16.03]*** [5.36]*** [20.03]***[24.11]*** [3.71]*** [12.58]***[24.62]*** [7.51]*** [20.42]*** [4.31]*** [19.94]***[12.47]***
0,000 0,009 0,036 0,157 0,018 0,239 0,115 0,052 0,156 -0,025 0,094 0,223 -0,043 0,171 0,190
[0.02] [0.72] [2.88]*** [10.85]*** [4.43]*** [20.29]***[10.98]*** [6.25]*** [11.48]*** [3.95]*** [3.31]*** [15.46]*** [3.02]*** [12.53]***[14.18]***
-0,024 0,025 -0,015 -0,265 0,001 -0,241 -0,222 -0,026 0,020 -0,052 0,034 -0,086 0,111 -0,064 -0,297
[2.19]** [2.44]** [1.78]* [22.35]*** [0.18] [20.43]***[27.17]*** [2.92]*** [1.47] [8.23]*** [1.55] [4.36]*** [8.45]*** [5.74]*** [26.61]***
-0,335 -0,262 -0,047 0,041 -0,037 -0,066 -0,212 -0,082 -0,453 -0,370 -0,317 -0,269 -0,367 0,016 -0,417
[11.50]***[12.14]*** [1.37] [0.30] [6.04]*** [1.72]* [9.27]*** [6.02]*** [14.13]***[34.29]*** [6.09]*** [5.47]*** [13.99]*** [0.23] [13.41]***
0,402 0,367 0,593 0,430 0,030 0,440 0,186 -0,012 0,121 -0,007 0,522 0,381 0,041 0,277 0,218
[7.44]*** [8.26]*** [9.52]*** [3.90]*** [2.87]*** [9.58]*** [6.81]*** [0.47] [2.62]*** [0.38] [8.19]*** [6.72]*** [0.96] [4.26]*** [4.10]***
0,545 0,635 0,441 0,342 0,055 0,370 0,346 0,014 0,287 0,133 0,449 0,543 0,328 0,450 0,499
[16.18]***[15.50]*** [8.59]*** [4.00]*** [7.34]*** [14.11]***[16.56]*** [0.99] [17.98]***[10.89]*** [7.52]*** [10.49]***[12.31]*** [8.74]*** [15.26]***
0,649 0,542 0,404 0,353 0,058 0,316 0,394 0,022 0,283 0,193 0,456 0,463 0,282 0,420 0,463
[14.72]***[12.29]*** [8.07]*** [4.28]*** [7.23]*** [12.74]***[16.08]*** [1.35] [16.18]***[13.42]*** [8.92]*** [10.90]*** [8.94]*** [9.19]*** [16.10]***
0,241
[1.27]
-0,082 -0,014 0,238 0,268 0,013 0,166 -0,127 -0,051 -0,206 -0,135 0,037 0,108 -0,183 0,216 -0,274
[2.33]** [0.52] [6.58]*** [1.97]** [2.12]** [4.24]*** [5.28]*** [3.13]*** [7.11]*** [9.04]*** [0.60] [2.10]** [4.55]*** [3.18]*** [7.67]***
-0,092 0,014 0,531 0,462 0,010 0,325 -0,137 -0,053 -0,406 -0,150 0,093 0,216 -0,222 0,488 -0,290
[2.40]** [0.43] [12.57]*** [3.82]*** [1.36] [7.25]*** [4.59]*** [3.10]*** [10.01]*** [9.86]*** [1.30] [3.45]*** [5.88]*** [6.84]*** [7.65]***
-0,014 0,070 0,515 0,587 0,029 0,432 -0,127 -0,025 -0,345 -0,161 0,235 0,350 -0,228 0,557 -0,380
[0.25] [1.58] [8.02]*** [2.69]*** [3.51]*** [6.46]*** [3.05]*** [1.05] [6.50]*** [8.00]*** [2.33]** [3.67]*** [4.99]*** [4.82]*** [6.21]***
0,046 0,226 0,575 0,011 0,491 -0,014 0,150 -0,374 -0,131 0,229 0,345 -0,197 0,503 -0,280
[0.71] [2.58]*** [5.67]*** [0.84] [8.14]*** [0.22] [4.09]*** [5.80]*** [5.66]*** [1.90]* [2.92]*** [4.24]*** [4.89]*** [3.66]***
-0,072 0,122 0,677 0,537 0,036 0,525 -0,123 -0,058 -0,554 -0,199 0,253 0,500 -0,210 0,576 -0,336
[1.26] [2.36]** [12.90]*** [3.80]*** [3.37]*** [9.42]*** [2.66]*** [2.42]** [9.02]*** [10.54]*** [2.35]** [5.82]*** [4.66]*** [7.06]*** [6.07]***
0,120 0,425 0,680 0,516 0,078 0,548 0,078 -0,003 -0,453 -0,180 0,479 0,564 -0,173 0,566 -0,304
[1.79]* [6.89]*** [14.88]*** [5.00]*** [6.05]*** [11.75]*** [1.45] [0.12] [7.07]*** [8.94]*** [4.77]*** [7.54]*** [3.58]*** [9.33]*** [5.22]***
0,000 -0,005 -0,024 -0,026 0,001 -0,015 -0,019 -0,001 0,011 -0,043 -0,003 -0,011 0,036 -0,017 -0,003
[0.04] [0.59] [2.66]*** [1.95]* [0.33] [1.03] [2.31]** [0.10] [1.00] [8.81]*** [0.17] [0.81] [3.11]*** [1.08] [0.32]
0,02 -0,03 0,02 -0,04 0,00 0,02 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,02 0,07 0,01 0,00 -0,02 -0,02
[1.83]* [1.43] [1.39] [3.44]*** [1.00] [1.48] [1.21] [0.17] [0.63] [3.03]*** [3.40]*** [0.67] [0.00] [1.14] [0.95]
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies
Regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 17470 17744 30168 21054 44184 37252 32679 19620 18797 75098 12661 20164 15208 20326 20028
Pseudo R-squared 0,34 0,40 0,40 0,24 0,09 0,31 0,25 0,05 0,21 0,14 0,34 0,37 0,31 0,30 0,24
EU25 Migrant 
House
Extra EU25 
Migrant House
Mixed 
Household
Male
Age
Age^2
Secondary 
Education
Tertiary 
Education
High income 
(before 
Low income (b.t)
House Owner
Single
Single with child
1 child
2 children
3 children
5 children
2 household 
members
Thinly populated 
area
3 hh members
4 hh members
5 hh members
6 hh members
7 hh members
Densly 
populated area
  
Table A3 
The probability of receiving non-contributory allowances: 
household probit regressions 
 
 
Notes: z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10percent; ** significant at 5percent; *** 
significant at 1percent;+ the EU-SILC does not distinguish between EU-25 and extra EU-25 
migrants;++ migrants identified by country of birth; the EU-SILC does not distinguish between 
EU-25 and extra EU-25 migrants. Low income variable defined as equivalized income lower 
than 60 percent of median income; High income variable defined as equivailzed income greater 
than 4/3 of median income. 
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ANNEX B: THE MIGRATION POLICY INDEX 
 
The fRDB index on migration collects information on twelve EU15 countries, from 
1994 to 2005, along seven different dimensions: 
1. The number of certificates and procedures needed to be admitted as a foreigner, 
whatever the motivations may be.  
2. The number of certification or procedures required to legally reside in the 
territory. This differs from the requirements for entering the country as holding 
a valid document is typically not sufficient.  
3. The number of years required to obtain a permanent residence permit.  
4. The number of administrations involved  
5. The number of years of stay required to obtain a first residence permit.  
6. The existence of a quota system 
7. Regulations as to asylum policy (developed from Hatton, 2004). 
The 7 dimensions were initially expressed either in different units or in an ordinal 
scale. To make those measures comparable, we converted them in cardinal scores 
and we normalized them to a range from 0 to 6, with higher score representing 
stricter regulation.  
As a last step, we computed an overall summary indicator for each country, 
averaging the values of the seven sub-indexes.  
The indicator of reform activity for highly skilled workers assumes three values: “-1” 
if the reform is permissive, “0” if neutral, and “1” if stringent. 
We define a reform as permissive if: 
• it lowers requirements for entry and to obtain residence or work permits 
• it introduces temporary permits 
• it reduces the number of years to obtain permanent residence permit 
• it helps the integration of migrants into the community 
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On the other hand, a reform is considered as restrictive if: 
• it introduces a quota system to entry 
• it increases requirements for entry and to obtain residence or work permits 
• it raises the number of years to obtain permanent residence permit and it 
introduces residence constraints 
A reform is neutral if it doesn’t affect the current legislation concerning immigration. 
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